Sec. 184, 185, 186 of Finance Act, 2017—Tribunalisation of justice was done not because the Courts were incapable of handling the matters but mainly because there were huge delays in settling matters.

Facts: The Madras Bar Association has preferred Writ Petition seeking reliefs that "(i) A writ of mandamus, directing the Union of India, to implement the directions of Hon’ble Court in Union of India vs. R. Gandhi (2010) and L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 where Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India was ordered to take over the administration of all Tribunals created by Parliament and streamline the functioning of the same and (ii) A writ of mandamus directing the Ministry of Law & Justice to promptly carry out a ‘judicial impact assessment’ on all Tribunals created by Parliament and submit a report on the same to this Hon’ble Court."

Held, that basic postulate of our Constitution is that every authority is subservient to constitutional supremacy. The adjudicatory power vests in the Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court. In adjudicating on whether there has been a violation of a constitutional mandate in passing a Bill as a Money Bill, judicial review does not traverse beyond the limit set by the separation of powers. On the contrary, the independence of judicial Tribunals has been consistently recognised by this Court as an inviolable feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. Determination of the norms of eligibility, the process of selection, conditions of service, and those regulating the impartiality with which the members of the Tribunals discharge their functions and their effectiveness as adjudicatory bodies is dependent on their isolation from the Executive. By leaving the rule-making power to the uncharted wisdom of the Executive, there has been a self-effacement by Parliament. The conferment of the power to frame rules on the Executive has a direct impact on the independence of the Tribunals. Allowing the Executive a controlling authority over diverse facets of the Tribunals would be destructive of judicial independence which constitutes a basic feature of the Constitution.In Madras Bar Association, s. 7 of the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 provided for the process of selection and appointment of the Chairperson and members of the NTT. The Court observed that as the jurisdiction of the High Courts was being transferred to the Tribunal, the stature of the members, conditions of service, and manner of appointment and removal of members must be akin to that of the Judges of High Courts. Sec. 7 was held to be invalid (among other provisions). The Central Government to whom a rule making authority was conferred by s. 184 has not observed the principles which were enunciated in R. Gandhi and Madras Bar Association either in letter or in spirit. Parliament would, in any event, have enacted the valid parts of the Finance Act, 2017 if it had known that Part XIV is invalid. The valid and invalid parts are not so inextricably linked that the invalidity of Part XIV should result in the invalidity of the rest. Nor is Part XIV a part of a composite scheme linked to the other parts of the Finance Act, 2017. Even after the excision of Part XIV the remaining part of the Finance Act would still survive on its own. Hence, Part XIV of the Finance Act, 2017 can be excised from the Act. Tribunals should command the same respect as the Judges of Courts and they should, as far as possible, have the same qualifications and attributes. This is absolutely necessary because if the people of this country are to have faith in Tribunals then it is the duty of all concerned to ensure that these Tribunals function fairly and independently like Courts are expected to. Tribunalisation of justice was done not because the Courts were incapable of handling the matters but mainly because there were huge delays in settling matters. Now even for complex commercial matters, specialised commercial Courts have been set up. However, at the same time, one cannot deny that in the fast-expanding technological world, there is a need to have expert adjudicators. Therefore, there is a need to have specialised Tribunals. These Tribunals being substitutes for Courts must also meet the expectations of our founding fathers and be totally independent and fearless. - ROJER MATHEW V/s SOUTH INDIAN BANK LTD. - [2020] 314 CTR 058 (SC)